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THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS:
PERSUASIVE FORCE OR BINDING LAW?
Sandra J. Weiland'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("Vienna Convention") sets
forth signatory nations' obligations to detained foreign nationals) The United
States adopted the Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol in 1963 and ratified
in 1969.2 Article 36 requires that detained foreign nationals be informed--"without
delay"-of their right to confer, communicate, and seek representation by their
consulate throughout their detention.
Although the United States considers treaties as part of the "law of the land,"4
its record in enforcing and complying with obligations set forth in the Vienna
Convention is inconsistent. The United States demands enforcement of diplomatic
and consular rights abroad, yet the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recently
found the United States in breach (for the third time) of the Vienna Convention. 5
Because of enhanced threats to U.S. citizens both abroad and at home, it is more
important than ever to have a consistent policy of enforcement and reciprocity
among nations.
After the ICJ's 2004 decision in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals,
6
President Bush ordered state courts to give "meaningfil review" to convicted
Mexican inmates who were not notified of their Vienna Convention rights.7 In a
J.D. Candidate, 2006, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
1. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
2. Id.; Michael Fleishman, Reciprocity Unmasked: The Role of the Mexican Government in
Defense of Its Foreign Nationals in United States Penalty Cases, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 359, 363
(2003).
3. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 1, at arts. 36(a)-(b) (stating that, upon
detainee request: "[T]he competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the
consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be
forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.").
4. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of rights depending upon it are duly presented for their determination").
5. Roberto Iraola, Federal Criminal Prosecutions and the Right to Consular Notification Under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 179, 180 (2002); Kelly Trainer, The Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations in the United States Courts, 13 TRANSNAT'L LAW 227, 230 (2000).
6. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
7. See Death Penalty Information, President Bush Orders Courts to Give Foreign Nationals on
Death Row Further Review, (Mar. 4, 2005), at
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recent brief submitted to the Supreme Court, the U.S. Solicitor General stated,
"Compliance serves to protect the interests of United States citizens abroad,
promotes the effective conduct of foreign relations, and underscores the United
States' commitment in the international community to the rule of law."8 Shortly
afterward, however, President Bush withdrew from the Optional Protocol that
gives the ICJ jurisdiction to hear cases, like Avena, arising under the Vienna
Convention.
9
The Vienna Convention expresses the international law rule of pacta sunt
servanda (once you enter an agreement in good faith you must aide by it), and the
United States' lack of enforcement of the rights and obligations under the Vienna
Convention has generated ill will in the international community.' 0 In this time of
increasing threats to United States citizens abroad and at home, the United States
should synthesize the Vienna Convention into its domestic law and demand
compliance from state and federal agencies. The United States' systematic Vienna
Convention violations undermine the integrity and accountability of the United
States internationally and demand redress within our court systems domestically.
Part II of this paper examines the issue of foreigners awaiting the death
penalty in the United States. Part III examines the rights and obligations created
under the Vienna Convention for foreigners. Part IV studies the evolution of the
legitimacy and enforcement of the Vienna Convention by examining the Breard"
and LaGrand2 cases. Part V examines the Torres13 case and the ICJ's Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) decision. Part VI
examines the current status of conflicting jurisprudence in the Fifth Circuit's recent
Medellin' 4 decision in which the United States Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari. Part VII concludes the paper.
II. FOREIGN NATIONALS & CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States reinstated capital punishment of foreign nationals in 1976.5
As of February 15, 2005, 119 foreign nationals await the death penalty.16 Most
foreign nationals on death row were not notified of their rights to confer with their
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=1345&scid=64.
8. See Amnesty International, USA: Another "Double Standard" on Consular Rights, (Mar. 10,
2005), at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510502005?open&of-ENG-392.
9. See Death Penalty Information, US. Abandons Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, (Mar. 10, 2005), at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=l 375&scid=64.
10. See Lou Ann Bohn, Understanding the Imposition of Capital Punishment on Foreign
Nationals in the United States as a Human Rights Violation, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 435 (2003).
11. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (U.S. 1998).
12. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998).
13. Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2003).
14. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004).
15. Death Penalty Forum, Foreign Nationals, Part II, (May 15, 2004), at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?sdid=31 & did=582#executed.
16. Death Penalty Forum, Foreign Nationals and the Death Penalty in the United States, (Feb. 15,
2005), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=l 98&scid=3 1.
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consuls and did not learn of their rights until after years of detainment and long
after exhausting most of their appeals.'
7
Currently, 118 countries have abolished the death penalty and 15 more retain
it only for crimes against humanity and war-time crimes. 8 Four nations-the
United States, China, Iran, and Viet Nam-carry out 84 percent of all executions.
1 9
For purposes of the following list, dual- citizenship cases are not listed because,
according to the United States State Department, individuals who hold both United
States citizenship as well as another nationality are not entitled to rights under the
20Vienna Convention.




18. Amnesty International, The Death Penalty, at
http://web.amnestyusa.org/abolish/foreign-nationals.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
19. Id.
20. Death Penalty Forum, supra note 16.
21. Id.
Mexico: 54 Spain: 1
Jamaica: 6 Tonga: 1
Cuba: 6 Trinidad: 1
Germany: 2 Philippines: 1
Columbia: 4 Nicaragua: 1
El Salvador: 5 Laos: I
Thailand: 1 Honduras: 2
Estonia: 2 Egypt: 1
Cambodia: 3 Bangladesh: 1
Viet Nam: 3 Haiti: 1
Croatia: 1 Jordan: 1
Lebanon: 1 Iran: 1
Peru: 1 Unknown nationality: 7
Canada: 1 Guatemala: 1







Viet Nam: 1 (awaiting retrial)
Thailand: 1 (awaiting
resentencing)
United Kingdom: (reversed on
appeal)
2005
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Further, foreign nationals face capital punishment in the following states
(number of nationals in each state in parenthesis): California (43), Texas (27),
Florida (21), Arizona (5), Ohio (4), Oklahoma (1), Nevada (4), Pennsylvania (2),
Louisiana (3), Virginia (1), Oregon (1), Montana (1), Georgia (1), Mississippi (1),
Alabama (1), Nebraska (1), and Federal (2).22
III. THE VIENNA CONVENTION: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
The United States must notify detained foreign nationals "without delay" of
their rights to confer with their consular officials.23 Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna
Convention is two-fold: (1) to notify "without. delay" the detained foreigner of his
right to confer with his consulate; and (2) to allow communication between the
detained foreign national and his consulate.24 This requirement gives people
traveling and living abroad the right to contact their consulates and seek assistance
when accused of a crime.
The Vienna Convention codified international customary law on consular
"relations, privileges and immunities., 25 The United States ratified the Vienna
Convention treaty without reservations in 1969 and agreed to the jurisdiction of the
ICJ, which hears disputes between nations.26 In March 2005, however, President
Bush withdrew the United States from the Optional Protocol that gives the ICJ
jurisdiction to hear disputes arising under the Vienna Convention.2 7
Ironically, the United States has been a leader in advancing the legitimacy and
binding effect of ICJ judgments.28 In 1979, when Iran held American hostages at
the United States Embassy in Iran, the United States immediately went to the ICJ
and demanded a judgment that Iran had violated international law.29
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the Vienna
Convention binds all states.30 Scholars debate whether the United States has
obligated itself to international treaties as binding on state's judicial and criminal
procedures. 3I And, even officials aware of the Vienna Convention do not always
adhere to it. Gene Acuna, spokesmen for Texas Governor Rick Perry, stated:
22. Id.
23. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 36(a)(b).
24. Id.
25. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
26. Id.
27. See Death Penalty Information, supra note 9.
28. Mark Weisburd, International Courts and American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 877, 270-72
(2000) (noting requests by the United States to allow consular access to Americans detained in
Germany, Syria, and Iran).
29. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Iran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treatise made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
3 1. See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception,
51 STAN. L. REv. 529, 553 (1999).
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"According to our reading of the law and the treaty, there is no authority for the
federal government or this World Court to prohibit Texas from exercising the laws
passed by our legislature. 32
IV. CASE STUDIES
A. Breard v. Greene
33
In 1992, the Commonwealth of Virginia arrested Angel Francisco Breard, a
dual citizen of Paraguay and Argentina, for rape and murder.34 At trial, the State
presented "overwhelming evidence of guilt, including semen found on the victim's
body matching Breard's DNA profile and hairs on the victim's body identical in all
microscopic characteristics to hair samples taken from Breard. ' '35 Breard refused
counsel and confessed to killing the victim, but explained that he did so only
because his father-in-law placed a satanic curse on him.36 A jury convicted Breard
and then sentenced him to death.37 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.3 8 The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari .
Only after Breard exhausted all of his state court proceedings did he learn that
Virginia officials violated his rights under the Vienna Convention, and he then
brought a habeas corpus petition in federal district court.40 The court denied his
petition, however, because of the "procedural default" rule: Breard had not raised
the issue in previous state court proceedings. 41 The court also found that Breard did
not show he suffered prejudice as a result of this procedural default. 42 The Fourth
Circuit affirmed.43 Notably, in a concurring opinion, a Fourth Circuit judge stated:
"United States citizens are scattered about the world.... Their freedom and safety
are seriously endangered if state officials fail to honor the Vienna Convention and
other nations follow their example.""
After Breard's conviction became final, Paraguay sued in the ICJ, stating that
the United States had violated the Vienna Convention.45 Because of Breard's
pending execution date, the ICJ issued an order before its judgment.46 The court
32. Reuters, Texas Snubs World Court on Execution Stays, (Feb. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.rense.com/general34/exce.htm.
33. Breard, 523 U.S. 371 (U.S. 1998).




38. Id. (citing Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670, 682 (Va. 1994)).
39. Id. (citing Breard v. Virginia, 513 U.S. 971 (1994)).
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1266 (E.D. Va. 1996)).
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 621 (1998)).
44. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th. Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concurring).
45. Breard, 523 U.S. at 374.
46. Id.
2005
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demanded that the United States "take all measures at its disposal to ensure that
Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these
proceedings.
' 47
Although the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Vienna Convention "arguably
confers on an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest,' A' the
Court voted (6-3) on the eve of Breard's execution and decided that under state
procedural rules "claims not so raised are considered defaulted., 49 The Court stated
that rights created under the Vienna Convention "shall be exercised in conformity
with the laws and regulations of the receiving State." 50 Thus, Breard could not then
raise a claim of violation of his rights under the Vienna Convention on federal
habeas corpus review. 5' Further, the Court held that Breard did not present any
evidence that he was prejudiced by this procedural bar.52 Even if Breard had
properly raised his Vienna Convention claims, the Court noted that it would be
unlikely that violations would reverse his conviction. 53 Notably, the Court "did not
see itself as constrained by the [ICJ's provisional] order.",
54
The Breard case illustrates the turmoil in the U.S. justice system. Three
justices dissented, stating that they would grant a stay of execution.55 Justice
Breyer wanted more time to weigh the "potential relevance of proceedings in an
intemational forum." '56 While the Justice Department argued the Court should deny
Breard's stay of execution, Secretary of State Madeline Albright sent a letter to the
Governor of Virginia pleading Virginia to comply with the ICJ's order and grant
the stay. The letter stated her concern for "the possible negative consequences for
the many U.S. citizens who live and travel abroad. 57 Within an hour after the
release of the Supreme Court's opinion, Angel Breard was executed.58
47. Id.
48. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376-77 (stating further that "neither the text nor the history of the Vienna
Convention clearly provides a foreign nation a private right of action in United State's courts to set
aside a criminal conviction and sentence for violation of consular notification provisions").
49. Id. at 375.
50. Patrick Dervishi, Comment, No Remedies for Violation of the Foreign Nationals' Right to
Consular Notification, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 645, 649 (2003) (quoting Breard, 523 U.S. at 375).
51. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
52. Id. at 377.
53. Jonathan 1. Chamey & W. Michael Reisman, Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 666, 673
(1988) (citing Breard, 523 U.S. at 377).
54. Mark Weisburd, International Courts and American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 877, 882
(2000).
55. Breard, 523 U.S. at 379.
56. Id. at 381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51
STAN. L. REV. 529, 553 (1999).
58. See Sarah M. Ray, Domesticating International Obligations: How to Ensure U.S. Compliance
with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1729, 1744 (2003).
VOL. 33:4
PERSUASIVE FORCE OR BINDING LAW?
B. Karl and Walter LaGrand59
Arizona accused the LaGrand brothers, who were German citizens, of
murdering a bank employee in a robbery attempt.60 After 17 years of confinement
and only weeks before their scheduled executions, Arizona officials notified the
brothers of their Vienna Convention rights.61 Shortly after becoming aware of their
citizens' plight, Germany sued the United States in the ICJ asserting that the
United States had violated the brothers' Vienna Convention rights by failing to
notify them of their rights to consular access.
62
The ICJ unanimously ordered a stay of execution because the brothers were
not informed of their rights to confer with the German consulate under the Vienna
Convention.63 The ICJ stated that the United States should take "all measures in its
disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision
in these proceedings, and should inform the Court of all the measures which it has
taken in implementation of that Order."
64
However, time was running out for the LaGrand brothers. The U.S. Supreme
Court held that it was too late to raise the issue of their Vienna Convention rights
due to the "tardiness of the pleas. ' '65 Despite the ICJ's injunction, the Court
permitted the execution to proceed and dismissed Germany's appeal.
66 Arizona
executed Walter LaGrand.67
Although both LaGrand brothers had been executed, Germany continued to
pursue its ICJ suit.68 The United States admitted to violating the Vienna
Convention and formally apologized to Germany. 69 The United States argued,
however, that the Vienna Convention had no authority to meddle within domestic
criminal procedural rules. 70 Germany argued that the Vienna Convention does
confer individual rights on states and that the U.S. "procedural default" rule
violated the Vienna Convention.7 '
59. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998).
60. Id. at 1257.
61. Amnesty International, United States of America: A Time for action-Protecting the Consular
Rights of Foreign Nationals Facing the Death Penalty, (Aug. 22, 2001), at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR511062001.
62. Sarah M. Ray, Domesticating International Obligations: How to Ensure U.S. Compliance with
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1729, 1744 (2003); Michael Fleishman,
Reciprocity Unmasked: The Role of the Mexican Government in Defense of Its Foreign Nationals in
United States Penalty Cases, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 359, 389-90 (2003).
63. Sarah M. Ray, Domesticating International Obligations: How to Ensure U.S. Compliance with
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1729, 1742-45 (2003).
64. La Grand Case (Germany v. United States of America), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27), available at
http://www.icj cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm.
65. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112 (1999).
66. Id.
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On June 27, 2001 the ICJ held for the first time that the provisional measures
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations are legally binding.7 2 The ICJ
found that the United States had breached its obligations to the LaGrand brothers
and to Germany under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention and failed to
provide a remedy for these violations.73 The ICJ held that pursuant to the Vienna
Convention: (1) an individual has the right to be notified of the right to
communicate with consul; (2) domestic "procedural default" rules cannot bar
judicial review of violations; and (3) violations demand judicial "review and
reconsideration. '74 The ICJ stated:
"[A]n apology would not suffice in cases where the individuals concerned
have been subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe
penalties. In the case of such a conviction and sentence, it would be incumbent
upon the United States to allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction
and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the
Convention. 75
Although the ICJ ordered the remedy of "review and reconsideration," U.S.
courts hold that defendants must prove they were prejudiced by not being informed
of their right to consular access to get a remedy.76
V. THE FACE OF LITIGATION TODAY: TORRES AND THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT
In a case similar to LaGrand, Oklahoma convicted Osbaldo Torres for killing
a couple during a burglary in Oklahoma City and sentenced him to death without
notifying him about his rights under the Vienna Convention. 77 The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence and denied other
claims for post-conviction relief.78 Torres subsequently filed a writ for habeas
corpus which was denied by the federal district court and affirmed in the Tenth
Circuit. 79 Torres then sought certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, alleging
(among other things) conflicts between the Tenth Circuit's ruling and the ICJ's
holding in LaGrand.80
A. The U.S. Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court declined certiorari.8' This denial of certiorari again
stalled judicial determination of what an appropriate "remedy" may be for
72. International Court of Justice Press Release, La Grand Case, (Germany v. United States of
America), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27, 2001), at http://www.icj
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm.
73. Ashley Wright Baker, Forcible Transborder Abduction: Defensive Versus Offensive Remedies
for Alvarez-Machain, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1373, 1392 (2004).
74. Lou Ann Bohn, Understanding the Imposition of Capital Punishment of Foreign Nationals in
the United States as a Human Rights Violation, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 435, 453 (2003).
75. See La Grand Case, supra note 64.
76. See Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996).
77. See Torres v. State, 962 P.2d 3 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998).
78. Id.
79. Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2003).
80. Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003) (denying certiorari).
81. Id.
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Oklahoma's failure to notify Torres of his Vienna Convention rights. Notably, in a
concurring opinion, Justice Stevens raised concerns that:
Applying the procedural default rule to Article 36 claims is not only in direct
violation of the Vienna Convention, but it is also manifestly unfair. The ICJ's
decision in LaGrand underscores that a foreign national who is presumptively
ignorant of his right to notification should not be deemed to have waived the
Article 36 protections simply because he failed to assert that right in a state
criminal proceeding.82
Justice Stevens concluded by saying that the procedural default doctrine,
which provides that States do not have to provide a remedy for violating a detained
foreign national's rights, is not in accord with the law of nations and thus the law
of the United States: "The Court is equally unfaithful to that command when it
permits state courts to disregard the Nation's treaty obligations. 83 Similarly, in
dissent, Justice Breyer wrote that Torres' and Mexico's arguments seemed"substantial. ' '84
B. International Court of Justice
In an unprecedented action, Mexico sued the United States alleging numerous
violations of the Vienna Convention in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States of America).8 5 Avena concerns 52 Mexican nationals
awaiting capital punishment in the United States, 86 and Torres is one of the 52
Mexican nationals in the suit.87 Mexico alleged that the United States consistently
ignored its obligations under the Vienna Convention and that detainees generally
learn of their rights years later, after their appeals have been exhausted.88 Although
Torres was arrested and convicted in 1993, the Mexican government was unaware
of his detainment until 1996 when members of Torres' family notified it.89 By this
time, Torres had already been through one mistrial and a second trial which placed
him on death row.
90
The United States contended that it followed the ICJ's orders handed down in
LaGrand, which requires "review and reconsideration" of Article 36 violations
cases through the clemency hearing process. Further, the United States insisted that
it is beyond the scope and authority of the ICJ to further interfere with its criminal
justice system.
91
82. Torres, 540 U.S. at 1036 (Stevens, J., concurring)
83. Id. at 1037.
84. Torres, 540 U.S. at 1041 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
86. Id.





91. Associated Press, U.S., Mexico in Death Penalty Feud, (Dec. 16, 2003), available at
http://www/cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/24/world/ffain585236.shtnl.
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Mexico argued that these 52 cases offer clear evidence of the United States
denial of Article 36 rights. The Mexican government asked the ICJ to: (1) define
the United States' obligations under the Vienna Convention; (2) define the scope
of "review and reconsideration;" (3) provide a remedy for its violations; and (4)
declare that the clemency process used by the United States to satisfy the "review
and reconsideration" requirement for violations inadequate.
9 2
Mexico, which strongly opposes the death penalty, asked the ICJ to order a
provisional measure to ensure that the named Mexican nationals in the suit were
not executed prior to the judgment being passed down.93 The ICJ unanimously
ordered the United States to take all measures necessary to avoid the execution of
the named Mexicans.94 The United States complied with this order.
C. Judgment Handed Down
On March 31, 2004, the ICJ handed down the judgment in Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals and ordered the United States to "review and [reconsider]" the
52 Mexican nationals' death sentences.95 The ICJ based its order on the numerous
violations of the United States' obligations to these detained foreign nationals
96
under the Vienna Convention. The ICJ held that the requisite advisement of
consular rights "without delay" is a "duty upon the arresting authorities to give the
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), information to the individual.., once it is realized that
the person is a foreign national, or once there are grounds to think that the person
is probably a foreign national." 97 Unfortunately, the decision said little about what
"review and reconsideration" necessarily entails or demands.
The ICJ held the following points in a vote of fourteen-to-one:
(1)The United States breached its obligations to 51 of the Mexican nationals
by not informing them "without delay" of their rights under Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention;
(2)The United States breached its obligations, under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention, by not notifying the Mexican consulate "without delay" of the
detention of 49 of the Mexican nationals;
(3)The United States breached its obligations, under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention, to 49 Mexican nationals by depriving them of their right to have
communication with, and access to, the Mexican consulate;




96. International Court of Justice Press Release, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, (Mar. 31,
2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2004/ipresscom2004-
16_mus_20040331.htm.
97. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128.
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(4)The United States its obligations, under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention, to 34 Mexican nationals by not allowing their consulate to arrange for
their legal representation in previous hearings;
(5)The United States breached its obligations, under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention, to three of the Mexican nationals, including Torres, by not permitting
the review and reconsideration of their cases; and
(6)Reparation for the above violations is "review and reconsideration" by the
United States.98
Further, the court unanimously held the following:
(1)The United States has evidenced a commitment to ensuring performance
of Vienna Convention rights, which satisfies Mexico's request for assurance
of future compliance; and
(2)"[R]eview and reconsideration" must be left up to the United States to
determine the "means of its own choosing." 99
The court failed to state what the scope of "review and reconsideration"
entails, but it did specify that the current executive clemency process alone was
insufficient.100 Thus, the ICJ flatly held that the United States had violated the
Vienna Convention and "did not shy away from what the United States had
characterized as interference in the U.S. judicial process." 10 1 Although treaties
ratified by the United States are supposed to be the "law of the land," not all states
honor these treaties. Texas and Oklahoma, where many Mexican nationals are on
death row, have already indicated an "unwillingness to comply" with the ICJ's
judgment.1 0 2 This result indicates that federalism tensions arise when balancing the
United States' compliance and commitment to international law with the autonomy
of the state's separate criminal justice systems.10 3 Texas Governor Rick Perry
stated that the International Court of Justice "does not have jurisdiction in
Texas."' 4 However, Governor Perry commuted Torres' death sentence shortly
after the ICJ's decision. 10 5 Subsequently, President Bush ordered state courts to
98. International Court of Justice Press Release, supra note 96.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2149 (2004).
102. Death Penalty Forum, California Considers Impact of International Court Ruling Regarding
Mexican Foreign Nationals, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did--950 &scid=64 (last
visited March 13, 2005).
103. See Jehanne E. Henry, Overcoming Federalism in Internationalized Death Penalty Cases, 25
TEX. INT'L L.J. 459,461 (2000).
104. Death Penalty Forum, No Justice in Rights Denied, (Apr. 3, 2004), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scidz3 I&did--955.
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give Mexican foreign nationals who were not notified of their Vienna Convention
rights "meaningful review.,
10 6
VI. Medellin v. Dretke'1 7
Medellin, a Mexican citizen, was convicted of capital murder and sentenced
to death.10 8 Medellin subsequently filed a writ for habeas corpus, which was
denied by the federal district court and affirmed in the Fifth Circuit.10 9 The Fifth
Circuit applied Breard's procedural default rule and held that the "[p]etitioner's
claim fails for two reasons: (1) it is procedurally defaulted, and (2) even if it were
not procedurally defaulted, the Vienna Convention, as interpreted by this Court in
the past, does not confer an individually enforceable right." 110 Mexican consular
officials were first notified of Medellin's incarceration when he wrote them from
death row. "'
The Fifth Circuit noted Medellin's claims that the ICJ's recent decisions in
LaGrand and Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, which held that a procedural
default cannot bar review. 1 2 Nonetheless, the court stated that under the Supreme
Court's Breard decision, claims can be procedurally defaulted in death penalty
cases and "only the Supreme Court may overrule a Supreme Court decision.""
3
Absent being "taught otherwise," the Fifth Circuit is bound to follow the Breard
precedent. 1 4 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit held that without indication from the
Supreme Court, it was bound by precedent that the Vienna Convention does not
create an individually enforceable right despite the ICJ's decisions in LaGrand and
Avena. 115
The Court granted certiorari in December 2004 and may resolve these
lingering issues.116
VII. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court in Paquette Habana stated: "International law is part
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination." ' 17 Although the Supreme Court refers to
customary international law as "part of our law" and part of the "law of the land,"
it has so far resisted enforcement of the Vienna Convention." 8
106. See Death Penalty Forum, supra note 7.
107. 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004).
108. Id. at 273-74.
109. Id. at 274.
110. Id. at 279.
111. Death Penalty Forum, News from the U.S. Supreme Court, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.phpdid=248&scid=38 (last visited March 14, 2005).
112. Medellin, 371 F.3d at 279-80.
113. Id. at 280.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
117. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
118. Id.
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Additionally, President Bush recently ordered state courts to give "meaningful
review" to Mexican nationals who were not informed of their Vienna Convention
rights but then ordered the withdrawal of the United States from the Optional
Protocol. This double-standard fails to encourage reciprocity among nations: "This
backward step cannot be reconciled with the United States' own declaration that
compliance with the ICJ serves to protect American interests abroad and promotes
the global rule of law."'1 19
U.S. federal and state governments should work cohesively to illustrate their
commitment to international law. We must reciprocate and uphold the rights and
obligations under the Vienna Convention to other nations. The Supreme Court's
voice must be heard regarding these lingering issues: (1) whether a petitioner's
failure to raise Vienna Convention violations in previous appeals results in a
procedural default; (2) whether an individually enforceable right is created by such
violations; and (3) what is the scope "review and reconsideration" for such
violations.
119. See Amnesty International, US Withdraws from VCCR Protocol is Step Backwards, (Mar. 10,
2005), at http://www.amnestyusa.org/new/document.do?id=C8544612FF018A4685256FC0006301.
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